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Abstract. As a result of their rapid economic growth, several powerful corporate 
giants have emerged in developing countries, especially in China, operating not 
only in the traditional manufacturing sector, but also in high-tech industries and 
finance. Major cities in developing countries have gradually become important 
command and control centres of the global economy, and have also become pow-
erful enough to be in the same tier as major cities of developed countries around 
the world. In this paper, I examine the position of cities as command and control 
centres on the basis of the power of their headquartered corporations. The result 
shows that until 2012, New York, London, Tokyo, and Paris; i.e. the global cities, 
were the leading command and control centres. However, the gap between these 
global cities and Beijing gradually closed, and by 2015, the Chinese capital out-
ranked all the global cities. The outstanding performance of Beijing-based corpo-
rations that operate in financial, energy, and construction services sectors is the 
driving force behind Beijing’s increasing global power. In addition, the leading 
position of the global cities as command and control centres has been threatened 
by the San Francisco-San Jose metropolitan region, a newly emerging economic 
hub in the United States.
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1. Introduction
Within the framework of the post-industrial econo-
my of our era, the role of traditional manufacturing 
firms has depreciated; however, they have a signif-
icant effect on the global economy. This is, for ex-
ample, demonstrated by the recent diesel scandal of 
Volkswagen, which could potentially push the glob-
al automotive industry into a crisis. Furthermore, 
those countries that are most significantly affected by 
the company’s foreign direct investments (e.g. Hun-
gary, the Czech Republic, and Poland) stand to lose 
0.5–1.5% points from their GDP growth. Although 
Volkswagen operates 119 production plants in 20 
European countries and an additional 11 countries 
in the Americas, Asia and Africa (1), all high-lev-
el decisions that basically influence the firm’s glob-
al strategy are made in the company’s headquarters 
in Wolfsburg, Germany (2). Therefore, regardless 
of the fact that this city is home to only one large 
transnational corporation (TNC), Wolfsburg can be 
considered as one of the major command and con-
trol centres of the world economy, and also one of 
the most significant ones in the international au-
tomotive industry. However, there are several cities 
worldwide that host the headquarters of not only 
one, but dozens, of large TNCs. Because of the ag-
gregate significance of the high-level decisions made 
in these corporate headquarters, such cities have an 
even more powerful impact on the world economy 
(Feagin, Smith, 1998). These cities are not neces-
sarily characterized as “world cities” as defined by 
Friedmann (1986), nor “global cities” as defined by 
Sassen (1991, 2001), but as home to the headquar-
ters of powerful TNCs, they can be considered as 
major command and control centres of the world 
economy (Knox, 1995; Godfrey, Zhou, 1999; Alder-
son, Beckfield, 2004; Sassen, 2006; Csomós, 2013).
Since the mid-1960s, momentous political and 
economic developments have affected the glob-
al economy (e.g. the emergence of the new inter-
national division of labour, the 1973 and 1979 oil 
crises, the collapse of the socialist system, and the 
global financial crisis of 2007–2008). These events, 
in part, have led to the massive growth of some de-
veloping countries (e.g. Brazil, China, India, Mexi-
co, Russia, and the Arab States of the Gulf) (Kose, 
2010). In line with these developments, the number 
of TNCs has increased rapidly (Ietto-Gillies, 2002). 
Until the mid-1990s, the United States, Western Eu-
rope, and Japan had been considered as the home-
lands of the major TNCs (Vernon, 1992). Since that 
time, several giant corporations have emerged in de-
veloping countries, especially in China (Goldstein, 
2007; Dunning et al., 2008; The Economist 2008; 
PwC, 2010). By now, TNCs in developing countries 
have become powerful enough to be able to com-
pete with their western rivals, not only in domes-
tic markets (Huber, Ennis, 2014), but also in other 
emerging markets; even markets of the developed 
countries (Tang, 2010). In recent years, through the 
acquisition of North American and Western Euro-
pean firms (Deng, 2007; Rui, Yip, 2008), several 
large Chinese and Indian companies have managed 
to gain new markets in the developed world. More-
over, by reversing the usual direction of foreign di-
rect investments (i.e. from the developed countries 
to the developing countries), they have been able 
to increase the power of their companies (Deng, 
2007; Li, 2010; Pradhan, Sauvant, 2010). As a re-
sult, the traditional command and control centres of 
the developed world have, relatively speaking, been 
losing power, while some cities in the developing 
world have been gradually emerging as major con-
trol points of the global economy. 
My main goal is to give a comprehensive litera-
ture overview of how the term “command and con-
trol” has changed over time, and to present which 
cities were the leading command and control cen-
tres of the world economy in 2006 and a decade 
later. Furthermore, through the example of Beijing, 
I highlight why Chinese cities have become signif-
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icant command and control centres, but have not 
become leading world cities.
The structure of this paper is as follows: First, 
I examine the command and control function of cit-
ies in the world city literature. Second, I rank cit-
ies on the basis of the power of their command and 
control function, and then I present the shifting 
global position of cities as command and control 
centres in the past decade (2006–2015) (3). Third, 
I  focus on Beijing, the city in which global power 
has recently grown to the largest extent, and attempt 
to inspect the prospects for further growth. 
2. The command and control function of 
cities in the mainstream world city 
literature
Globalization is one of the most important process-
es of today’s world. Since the second half of the 20th 
century, the restructuring of the world economy has 
intensified and can be characterized by, among oth-
er things, the increasing expansion of international 
trade and the rapid growth of foreign investments. 
However, the most spectacular phenomenon of eco-
nomic globalization is generally considered as the 
emergence of the new international division of la-
bour (NIDL) (Fröbel et al., 1980); that is, in this 
case, the gradually growing involvement of devel-
oping countries in the world economy, primarily as 
sites of low-cost production (Munck, 2002). As the 
orchestrators of the global reallocation of manufac-
turing away from core industrial countries towards 
developing countries, TNCs are generally regarded 
as the central actors in economic globalization (Co-
hen, 1981; Clarke, 1985; Schoenberger, 1988; Dick-
en, 2007). The organizations that make up TNCs 
encompass the world economy, connect nation-
al and regional economies, and exercise significant 
control over nation states (Bonanno, Constance, 
2008). In the new world system, in parallel with 
the declining importance of nation states, the role 
of cities has become more significant (see, for ex-
ample, Knox, 1995; Scott et al., 2001; Sassen, 2001; 
Sassen, 2006). Alderson and Beckfield (2004: 812) 
argue that “developments of the past few decades 
are seen as producing a new global hierarchy of cit-
ies, at the apex of which are located what have var-
iously been referred to as ‘world cities’ or ‘global 
cities’. Such cities constitute the key nodes or com-
mand points that exercise power over other cities 
in a system of cities and, thus, the world economy.” 
World cities/global cities are generally characterized 
as extremely complex entities by each fundamental 
theory in the field (Friedmann, 1986; 1995; Sassen, 
1991; 2001; Beaverstock et al., 1999; Hall, 2001; Tay-
lor, 2004); therefore, they are described on the ba-
sis of very different principles. However, regardless 
of the substantial differences, there are some over-
lapping elements in these theories. One of the most 
important elements is that world cities/global cities 
concentrate the headquarters of the most powerful 
TNCs worldwide, and this element makes them the 
major command and control centres of the world 
economy (Friedmann, Wolff, 1982; Konx, 1995; 
Smith, Timberlake, 1995; Godfrey, Zhou 1999; Al-
derson, Beckfield 2004; Sassen, 2006; Carroll, 2007; 
Taylor, Csomós, 2012).
Thereinafter, I examine how the notion of com-
mand and control appears in mainstream world city 
literature, and how ongoing economic globalization 
has influenced researchers’ opinions about the com-
mand and control function of cities.
In his pioneer work, entitled The World Cities, 
Peter Hall (1966) identified seven major cities (con-
urbations) as world cities (London, Paris, the Rand-
stad Holland, the Rhine-Ruhr, Moscow, New York, 
and Tokyo). According to Brenner and Keil (2006: 
20), “Hall conceived world cities primarily as na-
tional centres that channeled international forces 
and interests towards national interests. Hall’s con-
ception of a ‘world city’ is thus arguably a product 
of a period in which cities operated primarily as 
nodes within national urban systems.” It should be 
mentioned that Hall examined world cities rather as 
individual units from the perspective of urban plan-
ning, than as key actors in the world system. How-
ever, he initiated a wide range of criteria to define 
world cities, and according to two of those criteria, 
world cities were “the headquarters of major indus-
trial concerns” and “the headquarters of the trading 
banks” (Hall, 1966: 7).
Brenner and Keil (2006: 9) argue that the emer-
gence of the NIDL since the late 1960s resulted, in 
large measure, from the massive expansion in the 
role of TNCs in the production and exchange of 
commodities on a world scale. One very important 
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process of this period was the deindustrialization of 
the core economies (Linklater, 1990); that is, the re-
location of traditional low-cost manufacturing from 
the core economies towards the semi-peripheral 
and peripheral countries. In line with these devel-
opments, the corporate structure of manufacturing 
TNCs has undergone important changes. TNCs, as 
the main driving forces behind the spatial restruc-
turing of the world economy, have tended to sep-
arate the geographical location of their high-level 
activities (i.e. high-level decision-making, financial 
activity, and the control of the global commodity 
chain) from the manufacturing activities, relocating 
the latter into developing countries (Cohen, 1981; 
Pacione, 2009). One of the most remarkable schol-
ars of this period was Stephen Hymer, who suggest-
ed a “correspondence principle”, which attempted to 
identify and relate the centralization of control with-
in corporations to the concentration of economic 
activity within the international economy (Dun-
ning, Pitelis, 2010). Hymer (1972: 114) predicted 
that TNCs would tend to produce a hierarchical di-
vision of labour between geographical regions, and 
it would tend to centralize high-level decision-mak-
ing occupations in a few key cities (i.e. the world 
cities/global cities) in the advanced countries, sur-
rounded by a number of regional sub-capitals, and 
confine the rest of the world to lower levels of activ-
ity and income. According to Smith (2014: 101), it 
was Hymer who first outlined a global hierarchy of 
cities, and in that, he envisioned centralized control 
of the international economy as lying in some cit-
ies rather than others. Furthermore, Hymer (1972: 
124) argued that eventually New York, London, Par-
is, Bonn, Tokyo, Moscow, and Beijing would be the 
major global cities because they would be home to 
the core headquarter functions and high-level stra-
tegic planning of the world’s leading TNCs.
In the following two decades, as a legacy to 
Hymer’s outstanding work, several scholars con-
sidered the spatial concentration of corporate 
headquarters and high-level decision-making occu-
pations as the most important characteristics to de-
fine world cities, e.g. Heenan (1977); Cohen (1981); 
Friedmann and Wolff (1982); Glickman (1987); Fe-
agin and Smith (1987). However, John Friedmann’s 
(1986) article entitled The World City Hypothesis can 
be considered as the most significant contribution 
of this approach. It “consists of a series of gener-
alizations regarding urbanization in the context of 
globalization” (Alderson and Beckfield, 2004). The 
remarkable innovation of Friedmann’s work re-
sulted in the introduction of a clear taxonomy for 
world cities, according to which, world cities had 
to fulfil several major criteria (e.g. a major financial 
centre; headquarters for TNCs; international institu-
tions; rapid growth of business services sector; im-
portant manufacturing centre; major transportation 
node; population size). Moreover, their home coun-
tries had to be classified by the World Bank as core 
countries. Friedmann identified New York, Los An-
geles, Tokyo, London, Paris, and Chicago as prima-
ry world cities in core countries. In his hypothesis, 
Friedmann attributed special importance to the spa-
tial concentration of corporate headquarters; how-
ever, the criteria he established can be considered 
even more complex than that proposed by Hymer. 
According to Alderson and Beckfield (2004: 817–
–818), Hymer saw globalization generating a fair-
ly static urban hierarchy dominated by traditional 
powers, while Friedmann (1995) characterized the 
world city system as a dynamic hierarchy with ranks 
and entrance criteria that are open. A decade later, 
Friedmann (1995: 23–24) revised his former theory 
by classifying New York, London, and Tokyo as ma-
jor command and control centres exclusively.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, several stud-
ies have emerged that consider the spatial concen-
tration of corporate headquarters, or the power 
of TNCs, as the key feature when defining world 
cities (see, for example Knox, 1995; Lyons, Salm-
on, 1995; Godfrey, Zhou, 1999; Alderson, Beck-
field, 2004; Taylor, Csomós, 2012; Csomós, 2013; 
Csomós, Derudder, 2014a); however, in the follow-
ing decades, the significance of this kind of research 
approach has started to fade away. In 1991, Sas-
kia Sassen’s pioneering work, The Global City, was 
published, and since her introduction of the global 
city concept, researchers’ conceptualization on the 
functional centrality of cities in the global economy 
has radically changed (Derudder, 2006). Accord-
ing to Sassen (2001: 4), beyond their long histo-
ry as centres for international trade and banking, 
global cities (New York, London, Tokyo, Frankfurt, 
and Paris) now function in four new ways: first, as 
highly concentrated command points in the organ-
ization of the world economy; second, as key loca-
tions for finance and specialized service firms that 
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have replaced manufacturing as the leading eco-
nomic sector; third, as sites of production, includ-
ing the production of innovations, in these leading 
industries; and fourth, as markets for the products 
and innovations produced. In her concept, Sassen’s 
(2001: 6) focus is not on power, but on production: 
the production of those inputs that constitute the 
capability for global control. Sassen (1991, 1995, 
2001) argues that the awesome power of large cor-
porations is insufficient to explain the capability for 
global control. According to Taylor (2004: 25), on 
the basis of Sassen’s global city concept, it can be 
stated that global cities are more than merely com-
mand and control centres; they are the first global 
service centres in urban history.
Since the introduction of Sassen’s global city con-
cept, it has become widely recognized that advanced 
producer service (APS) organizations are the dis-
tinctive feature of contemporary world city forma-
tion (Beaverstock et al., 1999). Furthermore, Peter 
J. Taylor (2001) introduced his interlocking network 
model (INM) in which “globalised producer servic-
es firms are the key ‘network makers’ connecting 
cities in a ‘world city network’ (WCN)” (Derudder, 
Parnreiter, 2014). As a consequence of these major 
concepts (Sassen’s global city theory and Taylor’s in-
terlocking network model), APS firms and banks 
have become the key agents of the world city forma-
tion (see, for example, Beaverstock et al. 1999; Tay-
lor et al., 2002; Derudder et al., 2003; Taylor, 2004; 
Derudder, Taylor, 2005; Hanssens et al., 2013; Neal, 
2014; Taylor, 2014), and they have significantly con-
tributed to the diminishment of the importance of 
TNCs as symbols of world cities.
In this paper, I examine the command and con-
trol function of cities as originally defined by Hymer 
(1972) and Friedmann (1986); that is, I attribute the 
command and control function of cities to the pow-
er of the TNCs they host. The reason for this is that 
in developing countries, a growing number of giant 
manufacturing corporations and banks have been 
established (for example, the leading four compa-
nies of the Forbes “The Global 2,000” for 2015 are 
all headquartered in China), and they can signifi-
cantly affect the world economy (Sauvant, 2008). In 
developing countries, the high-level decision-mak-
ing activities of large corporations tend to be ge-
ographically more concentrated in some dominant 
cities, and primarily in capitals; therefore, some of 
these cities have become globally important head-
quarter cities (see, for example, Lai, 2012; Ma et al., 
2013; Pan, Xia, 2014; Pan et al., 2015). However, 
despite the rapid growth of their economies, the fi-
nancial systems of developing countries can gener-
ally be considered as fairly undeveloped (Elliot, Yan, 
2013), and cannot be compared with those of de-
veloped countries (The World Bank, 2012). Thus, 
although they may possess giant banks in terms 
of assets, large stock exchanges in terms of mar-
ket capitalization, and impressive goals for the fu-
ture development of international financial centres 
(see, for example, Cheung, 2010; Lai, 2012; Pethe et 
al., 2014; Yildirim, Mullineux, 2015), the major fi-
nancial centres of developing countries (e.g. Beijing, 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, Bangkok, Sao Paulo, Mumbai) 
still cannot be considered competitive with those of 
the major financial centres in developed countries 
(e.g. New York, London, Paris, Frankfurt) (Du et al., 
2014; Chen, Chen, 2015; Z/Yen Group, 2015). How-
ever, as homes to powerful corporations in terms 
of their size, leading headquarter cities in develop-
ing countries have emerged as major command and 
control centres of the world economy and as real 
rivals for the command and control centres of de-
veloped countries. While the financial side of the 
world economy has relative stability and is domi-
nated by the financial centres of the United States, 
Western Europe, and Japan, in the real economy, 
radical changes have occurred, primarily thanks to 
the massive growth of the Chinese economy.
3. Data and methods
After explaining how the command and control 
function of cities is defined in this paper, it is nec-
essary to clarify two more critical issues of the em-
pirical analysis: first, how the command and control 
function of cities can be measured; and second, 
what the territorial demarcation of cities is.
3.1. Measuring the command and control 
function of cities on the basis of the 
power of the TNCs they host
Researchers use several methods to measure the 
command and control function of cities; however, 
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most of them are largely influenced by subjective 
impressions. In general, it is very common to count 
the number of headquarters of leading TNCs and 
banks (perhaps the regional headquarters of sub-
sidiaries) that are concentrated in given cities; and 
then, on the basis of this sum or by some sort of 
weighted scoring, define the position of these cities 
in the national/world city system (see, for example, 
Borchert, 1978; Cohen, 1981; Wheeler, 1985; Hol-
loway, Wheeler, 1991; Meijer, 1993; Lyons, Salmon, 
1995; Abbott, 1997; Godfrey, Zhou, 1999; Alderson, 
Beckfield, 2004; Taylor et al., 2009). Counting the 
number of TNC headquarters located in given cit-
ies has key importance in several studies and can 
definitely be measured on some level in regard to 
the command and control function; however, this 
alone cannot adequately reflect the real power of 
cities as they pertain to the economy. The difference 
between these approaches (i.e. the concentration of 
headquarters vs. the power of cities) is presented 
through an example: According to studies that focus 
on the spatial concentration of headquarters of lead-
ing TNCs, only Tokyo, New York, London, and Par-
is can be considered as major command and control 
centres of the world economy (Godfrey, Zhou, 1999; 
Alderson, Beckfield, 2004, Taylor et al., 2009; MGI, 
2011), while these studies give minor consideration 
to some important second-tier cities, e.g. Beijing, 
Osaka, and Zurich. As a matter of fact, the head-
quarters of several globally influential TNCs can 
be found in the major cities. For example, in 2015, 
a  combined total of 365 out of the 2,000 Forbes 
companies were headquartered in Tokyo, New York, 
London, and Paris; that is, 18% of the leading TNCs 
were concentrated in these four cities. None of the 
studies consider Bentonville, Arkansas, with a pop-
ulation of 40,000, as a command and control cen-
tre of the world economy. Since the city is home to 
only one single large TNC, this is not surprising. In 
2015, the Forbes 2,000 companies were headquar-
tered in 390 cities worldwide, but of these cities, 202 
hosted only a single TNC. Bentonville falls into this 
latter category, and therefore, obviously cannot be 
compared with the major world cities that are home 
to 30 or more corporate headquarters. However, if 
one considers the power of a TNC as the basic de-
terminant of the command and control function 
of cities, it should be mentioned that Bentonville 
is home to Walmart, the world’s largest retail com-
pany with more than 11,000 stores in 27 countries. 
Walmart is the largest non-governmental employer 
in the world, with 2.2 million employees worldwide, 
as well as the largest non-governmental employ-
er in the United States, with 1.4 million employ-
ees nationwide; that is, Walmart employs 1% of the 
United States’ work force. In 2015, Walmart gen-
erated revenues of $485.7 billion, which was more 
than that of any other company in the world, and, 
in fact, more than the combined revenues of Osaka’s 
35 Forbes companies. By exercising enormous mar-
ket power, Walmart is capable of influencing local 
and national wages, even retail prices (Basker, 2005; 
Bonanno, Lopez, 2012), and with its large assets, the 
company is capable of entering foreign markets (Ia-
covone et al., 2015). All the strategic decisions made 
in the Bentonville headquarters of Walmart can sig-
nificantly affect retailing, the economy of the United 
States (Economy in Crisis, 2012), and indirectly the 
world economy. Therefore, regardless of the obvious 
fact that Bentonville is not a world city, it can be 
considered as one of the most important command 
and control centre of the world economy.
In this analysis, I do not merely calculate the 
number of headquarters concentrated in any given 
city, but I also determine the command and con-
trol function of cities on the basis of the power of 
the TNCs they host. For this reason, several cities 
appear in my rankings that are generally not men-
tioned as world cities. In this analysis, I use data 
from the Forbes “The Global 2,000” database from 
the years 2006 and 2015. These data correspond to 
the main financial data (revenues, market value, as-
sets, and profits) of the 2,000 largest public compa-
nies of the world. I integrate information on the key 
indicators of firm size and performance. The level 
of command and control (i.e. the power of cities) 
is expressed by the Command and Control Index 
(CCI). CCIx,y of a given city x in a given year y is 
calculated as follows (Csomós, 2013; Csomós, Der-
udder, 2014b):
x,yn
i,x,y i,x,y i,x,y i,x,y
x,y
i=1
R +A +P +MV
CCI =
4∑
Where:
Ri,x,y = the proportion of revenues in the total 
dataset;
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Ai,x,y = the proportion of assets in the total da-
taset;
Pi,x,y = the proportion of profit in the total da-
taset;
MVi,x,y = the proportion of market value in the 
total dataset;
i = the number of the company headquar-
tered in city in given year (i = 1,…,nx,y);
n = the total number of companies head-
quartered in city x in year y;
In conclusion, the CCI is a measure without unit 
and reflects the power of cities as command and 
control centres. 
3.2. Territorial demarcation of “cities”
Another fundamental issue of this analysis is the 
territorial demarcation of cities. Derudder (2006) 
argues that in Sassen’s global city concept, a glob-
al city corresponds to those units that have link-
age to the world economy and where business 
activities are conducted (i.e. the city that hosts the 
traditional central business district), while in Fried-
mann’s world city concept, a world city corresponds 
to a  much larger territorial unit; such as a metro-
politan region, in which corporate headquarters are 
spread out over a larger area. In this paper, I con-
sider Friedmann’s world city definition as the basis 
for the territorial demarcation of the empirical anal-
ysis; therefore, I integrate individual headquarters’ 
cities and towns into large urban zones. Florida and 
Jonas (1991), Lyons and Salmon (1995), and even 
Sassen (2006) all stress that in the United States, 
and then in Europe, the relocation of headquar-
ters from large cities to suburban areas has become 
quite common since the 1970s. This phenomenon 
is what Florida and Jonas (1991) refer to as the “de-
centralization of corporate organizations”. Accord-
ing to Garreau (1991), Brenner (2002), and Ross 
and Levine (2012), this development has resulted 
in a significant change in the suburban network of 
metropolitan areas: suburbs have begun to play an 
active role in the economy. Because of the gener-
al trend of the suburbanization of corporate head-
quarters since the 1970s, suburbs, regarding their 
economic functions, cannot adequately be separat-
ed from the central cities of their metropolitan re-
gions (Muller, 1978).
When defining “cities” as territorial units, I re-
lied on the territorial demarcation of respective na-
tional statistical offices, the ESPON EGTC in the 
European Union (www.espon.eu), and the Office 
of Management and Budget in the United States 
(www.whitehouse.gov/omb). For example, in my 
framework, “New York” corresponds to the New 
York–Newark–Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Metropolitan 
Statistical Area, which is home to the headquarters 
of 87 Forbes 2,000 companies. However, of these 
87 companies, 55 are headquartered in New York 
City, and 32 are located in 27 smaller or larger cit-
ies (Armonk, Paramus, Roseland, etc.) within the 
New York metropolitan area. In Japan, for example, 
Osaka corresponds to the large Keihanshin metro-
politan region that encompasses the metropolitan 
areas of Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe. Paris corresponds 
roughly to the entire Ile-de-France region, which 
includes 1,800 cities and towns. In line with this 
method of territorial demarcation of cities as com-
mand and control centres, I define cities in the same 
way in all countries (4).
In 2006, Forbes 2,000 companies were headquar-
tered in 687 cities, which could be integrated into 
353 metropolitan regions; and in 2015, they were 
located in 683 cities and could be integrated into 
390 metropolitan regions.
4. Changing position of cities 
as command and control centres 
between 2006 and 2015
Reed (1981); Meyer (1986); Glickman (1987); Thrift 
(1989); Sassen (1994); Budd (1995); Short et al. 
(1996); Godfrey and Zhou (1999); Sassen (2001); 
Taylor et al. (2009); Lee et al. (2012) stress the out-
standing roles of New York, London, Tokyo, and 
Paris in the global economy as major world cit-
ies, global cities, financial centres, etc. The rank-
ing, on the basis of the value of the CCI (5), also 
shows that until 2006, New York, Tokyo, London, 
and Paris had been the leading command and con-
trol centres (Table 1), with more than 30% of the 
combined value of the CCI. However, in more re-
cent years, radical changes have occurred, primari-
ly due to the massive growth of Beijing’s command 
and control function. On the basis of its CCI value, 
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the Chinese capital arrived right behind the major 
cities in 2007, then, between 2012 and 2014, Beijing 
outranked Paris (2012), London (2013), and Tokyo 
Table 1. Ranking the leading command and control centres in 2006 and 2015 on the basis of their CCI value
Rank City/Metro Country Number of HQs
CCI 
2006 City/Metro Country
Number 
of HQs
CCI 
2015
1 New York United States 97 8.897 Beijing China 59 7.610
2 Tokyo Japan 199 8.088 New York United States 87 6.588
3 London United Kingdom 94 6.547 Tokyo Japan 142 6.279
4 Paris France 66 5.695 London United Kingdom 79 5.139
5 Dallas United States 28 2.201 Paris France 57 4.502
6 Zurich Switzerland 13 1.843 San Jose United States 28 2.374
7 San Francisco United States 25 1.670 San Francisco United States 21 2.321
8 Seoul South Korea 44 1.659 Seoul South Korea 59 2.241
9 Amsterdam Netherlands 14 1.607 Hong Kong China/Hong Kong 55 2.228
10 Chicago United States 38 1.583 Washington United States 18 1.746
11 Houston United States 34 1.527 Toronto Canada 17 1.512
12 San Jose United States 29 1.505 Dallas United States 22 1.510
13 Washington United States 21 1.437 Chicago United States 35 1.474
14 Toronto Canada 20 1.405 Zurich Switzerland 23 1.472
15 Charlotte United States 8 1.356 Moscow Russia 20 1.280
16 Munich Germany 9 1.345 Houston United States 25 1.212
17 Madrid Spain 19 1.324 Shanghai China 20 1.114
18 Osaka Japan 47 1.296 Stockholm Sweden 21 1.034
19 Beijing China 15 1.294 Munich Germany 8 0.989
20 Atlanta United States 19 1.177 Minneapolis United States 15 0.975
21 Minneapolis United States 20 1.160 Shenzhen China 15 0.971
22 The Hague Netherlands 3 1.145 Seattle United States 11 0.937
23 Bridgeport United States 12 1.104 Sydney Australia 20 0.934
24 Stockholm Sweden 23 1.064 Madrid Spain 16 0.910
25 Edinburgh United Kingdom 3 1.029 Mumbai India 24 0.897
26 Nagoya Japan 23 1.027 Nagoya Japan 14 0.876
27 Hong Kong China/Hong Kong 35 1.019 Atlanta United States 17 0.865
28 Seattle United States 12 1.012 Osaka Japan 35 0.864
29 Detroit United States 14 0.914 Taipei City Taiwan 31 0.809
30 Frankfurt Germany 7 0.858 Melbourne Australia 9 0.776
31 Rome Italy 8 0.852 Newbury United Kingdom 1 0.753
32 Los Angeles United States 27 0.821 Bridgeport United States 13 0.725
33 Melbourne Australia 12 0.760 The Hague Netherlands 4 0.717
34 Cincinnati United States 12 0.747 Omaha United States 4 0.714
35 Moscow Russia 8 0.723 Los Angeles United States 21 0.699
36 Fayetteville* United States 3 0.715 Sao Paulo Brazil 12 0.673
37 Milan Italy 15 0.702 Fayetteville* United States 3 0.671
38 Sydney Australia 20 0.693 Frankfurt Germany 5 0.652
39 Philadelphia United States 19 0.675 Philadelphia United States 15 0.649
40 Brussels Belgium 11 0.609 Charlotte United States 4 0.635
(2014), and finally it managed to surpass New York 
in 2015, becoming the leading command and con-
trol centre of the world economy.
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41 Richmond United States 9 0.578 Singapore Singapore 20 0.630
42 Calgary Canada 17 0.561 Basel Switzerland 6 0.627
43 Taipei City Taiwan 26 0.555 Dublin Ireland 18 0.622
44 Basel Switzerland 8 0.532 Boston United States 16 0.593
45 Riyadh Saudi Arabia 5 0.530 Amsterdam Netherlands 10 0.561
46 Düsseldorf Germany 5 0.508 Detroit United States 10 0.558
47 Boston United States 17 0.492 Cincinnati United States 8 0.524
48 Hartford United States 6 0.477 Calgary Canada 13 0.473
49 Helsinki Finland 15 0.466 Montreal Canada 13 0.459
50 Stuttgart Germany 4 0.454 Riyadh Saudi Arabia 15 0.459
Explanation:  *The Fayetteville metropolitan area includes Bentonville, Arkansas; the headquarters city of Walmart
Source of data: Forbes “The Global 2,000”, 2006 and Forbes “The Global 2,000”, 2015
Similarly to that of Beijing, the CCI value of 
other major Chinese cities grew rapidly; there-
fore, Hong Kong (ranked 27th in 2006, 9th in 2015), 
Shanghai (ranked 111th in 2006, 17th in 2015), and 
Shenzhen (ranked 129th in 2006, 21st in 2015) also 
appeared among the leading command and control 
centres in 2015. Furthermore, the latter two cities 
showed the most significant increase in terms of 
their CCI values in the past decade: the CCI value 
of Shenzhen increased by almost 1,000%, Shanghai’s 
increased by almost 800%, whereas Beijing’s showed 
the third-largest increase (Table 2). 
In 2006, New York, Tokyo, London, and Paris 
were primarily followed by North American cities. 
In fact, six out of the next ten cities (5th–14th in the 
ranking) were located in the United States, and one 
of them was located in Canada. Two European cit-
ies, Zurich and Amsterdam, also belonged to this 
group, as well as Seoul in East Asia. By 2015, the 
CCI value of Amsterdam decreased by 65%, and its 
position significantly weakened (ranked 9th in 2006, 
45th in 2015), while Zurich showed a much small-
er decrease in its position (ranked 6th in 2006, 14th 
in 2015). The CCI value of Seoul increased by 35%; 
however, its position did not change (ranked 8th in 
both years). Furthermore, during this decade, Hong 
Kong showed a creditable growth and by 2015, oc-
cupied a much better position. In 2015, a number 
of North American cities could be found among 
the leading command and control centres; howev-
er, their positions in the ranking changed signifi-
cantly. The positions of Dallas (ranked 5th in 2006, 
12th in 2015), Chicago (ranked 10th in 2006, 13th in 
2015), and Houston (ranked 11th in 2006, 16th in 
2015) weakened, while the position of San Jose im-
proved, and by 2015, that city arrived right behind 
the major command and control centres (ranked 
6th in 2015). Washington and Toronto also showed 
a  smaller increase in their positions, while San 
Francisco remained the same (ranked 7th in both 
years); however, its CCI value grew by 39%.
As can be seen in Table 1, in 2006, the ma-
jor command and control centres (New York, To-
kyo, London, and Paris) were followed mostly by 
cities of developed countries: 20 out of the lead-
ing 50 cities were located in the United Sates, and 
17 were located in Europe. The developing countries 
(6) were singularly represented by Beijing (ranked 
19th), Moscow (ranked 35th), and Riyadh (ranked 
45th). By 2015, the number of cities in developing 
countries among the leading command and con-
trol centres grew, but not significantly. In fact, aside 
from Beijing, Moscow, and Riyadh, only Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Mumbai, and Sao Paulo entered into this 
group of leading cities. However, it is worth noting 
that the CCI value of these cities increased dynam-
ically in this period: the CCI value of Mumbai in-
creased by 152%, while that of Sao Paulo increased 
by 189%, not mentioning the extreme growth of the 
major Chinese cities (Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Bei-
jing) (Table 2). 
The geographical shift of the world’s command 
and control function shows a typical pattern. On 
the one hand, along with the significant growth of 
the CCI value of the Chinese cities, the CCI val-
ue of cities located in the Arab states of the Per-
sian Gulf and those of Indian cities also increased 
by more than 100% (Fig. 1). On the other hand, the 
CCI value of the traditional command and control 
centres located in North America (particularly in 
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Table 2. TOP 25 command and control centres with the largest positive and negative CCI change
Rank City/Metro* Country
Positive CCI 
Change, 
2006/2015 (%)
City/Metro Country*
Negative CCI 
Change, 2006/2015 
(%)
1 Shenzhen China 999.06 Austin, Texas United States -83.67
2 Shanghai China 796.39 Kansas City United States -77.80
3 Beijing China 488.04 Amsterdam Netherlands -65.07
4 Leuven Belgium 327.50 Hamilton Bermuda -65.06
5 Newbury United Kingdom 226.66 Edinburgh United Kingdom -62.24
6 Sao Paulo Brazil 189.10 Richmond United States -61.04
7 Mumbai India 152.32 Cleveland United States -58.03
8 Hong Kong China/Hong 
Kong
118.65 Charlotte United States -53.19
9 Wolfsburg Germany 106.31 Rome Italy -51.25
10 Barcelona Spain 104.18 Brussels Belgium -47.97
11 Providence United States 103.44 Essen Germany -46.33
12 Lisbon Portugal 95.03 Athens Greece -45.98
13 Santiago Chile 94.61 Düsseldorf Germany -44.53
14 Jakarta Indonesia 86.09 Oklahoma City United States -42.34
15 Moscow Russia 76.96 Bonn Germany -42.08
16 Bangkok Thailand 74.77 Phoenix United States -41.35
17 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia 72.32 Milan Italy -41.06
18 Brasília Brazil 68.86 Helsinki Finland -39.84
19 Portland, 
Oregon
United States 66.91 Detroit United States -38.95
20 Singapore Singapore 66.60 The Hague Netherlands -37.36
21 Omaha United States 58.68 Columbus, 
Ohio
United States -36.60
22 San Jose United States 57.76 Rio de Janeiro Brazil -35.29
23 San Diego United States 53.98 Bridgeport United States -34.36
24 Dublin Ireland 48.53 Osaka Japan -33.34
25 Taipei City Taiwan 45.74 Dallas United States -31.41
Explanation: *Requirement: the combined value of CCI 2006 and CCI 2015 of a given city should exceed 0.2
Source of data: Forbes “The Global 2,000”, 2006 and Forbes “The Global 2,000”, 2015
There are some cities among the leading com-
mand and control centres in which CCI value 
has been influenced by only one large TNC. The 
best examples are Leuven (Anheuser-Busch In-
Bev), Newbury (Vodafone Group), and Wolfs-
burg (Volkswagen AG). Of course, the position of 
these cities is very unstable. The outstanding fi-
nancial performance of Vodafone in financial year 
2014/2015 was largely due to the fact that the com-
pany sold its 45% stake in Verizon Wireless to 
Verizon Communications for $130 billion. It is as-
sumed that in the future, the CCI value of Leuven 
will also grow, since Anheuser-Busch InBev an-
nounced the acquisition of its largest competitor, 
SABMiller (headquartered in London) for $104 bil-
lion. Conversely, after the diesel scandal of Volkswa-
gen, the CCI value of Wolfsburg will predictably 
decrease.
the United States), Western Europe, and Japan de-
creased significantly. These shifts correspond to the 
opinion of Castells et al. (2012: 12): the financial 
crisis of 2007–2008 and the following global eco-
nomic crisis of 2008–2012 can rather be considered 
as two examples of “non-global global crisis of capi-
talism”; because, for example, this crisis only slightly 
affected the economies of Latin America and China.
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Most cities with the largest negative CCI change 
are typically home to more than one TNC, but they 
are generally facing deep structural crisis in their 
economy. To illustrate, since the financial crisis 
of 2007–2008, the financial sectors of Amsterdam 
and Edinburgh have significantly weakened; Ham-
ilton, Bermuda has been continuously losing the 
headquarters of TNCs (which generally have been 
moving to Dublin or Zurich) since the Obama ad-
ministration promised to act against tax havens; 
and Detroit’s automotive industry has recovered 
slowly. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that in the past 
decade, but primarily since the financial crisis of 
2007–2008, the relative power of the tradition-
al command and control centres; i.e. that of New 
York, Tokyo, London, and Paris, has significant-
ly weakened. Beijing has become the major control 
point of China, the newly emerged powerhouse of 
the world economy, and now the largest command 
and control centre in the world (see also Csomós, 
Tóth, 2016). In addition, the pressure on New York, 
Tokyo, London, and Paris has intensified due to the 
fact that the combined CCI value (4.695 in 2015) 
of the San Jose-San Francisco metropolitan region 
has radically increased, and outranked that of Par-
is in 2015.
5. The rise of Beijing 
and the sources of its power
By 2015, on the basis of the power of headquar-
tered companies, Beijing has become the largest 
command and control centre of the world econo-
my. This means, first, that Beijing has managed to 
surpass its most powerful regional rivals, Tokyo and 
Seoul, in less than a decade; and second, the Chi-
nese capital is the only city that has ever managed 
to outrank the four major command and control 
centres, New York, London, Tokyo, and Paris.
This rapid growth of the Chinese capital’s com-
mand and control function can primarily be at-
tributed to the fact that Beijing-based state-owned 
banks and energy companies have become extreme-
ly powerful (Fig. 2).
Due to China’s enormous energy demand, gen-
erated by the large transportation sector (Dargay, 
Gately, 2010; Lin, Xie, 2013), and the rapidly grow-
ing number of private cars (MGI, 2006; 2013), oil 
and gas consumption has been continuously in-
creasing in this country. Since 1993, China has 
become a net oil importer, and by 2012, its depend-
ency on imported oil exceeded 60% (Zhang, 2014). 
The Chinese oil companies are among the largest 
foreign investors in the global oil and gas industry. 
They invest and operate worldwide, including in Af-
Fig. 1. Change of the value of the CCI by geographical subgroups
Source of data: Forbes “The Global 2,000”, 2006 and Forbes “The Global 2,000”, 2015
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rica and Latin America, where they are the most 
important actors. According to projections by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), it is foreseeable 
that Chinese oil and gas consumption will dramati-
cally increase in the future, and China’s national oil 
companies (NOCs) are expected to be the instru-
ments to satisfy the growing demand (IEA, 2011). 
The headquarters of all three state-owned oil giants, 
PetroChina, Sinopec, and CNOOC, are located in 
Beijing; therefore, the dominant role of the Chinese 
capital in the energy sector is not surprising (Pegg, 
2012; Pan et al., 2015).
Fig. 2. Industry-specific distribution of the command and control function of Beijing
Source of data: Forbes “The Global 2,000”, 2006 and Forbes “The Global 2,000”, 2015
The extreme power of Beijing in terms of the val-
ue of the CCI does not straightforwardly show its 
role in the global financial sector. With respect to 
its CCI value, it could be easily stated that Bei-
jing has become the world’s major financial centre. 
In  2015, the CCI value of Beijing’s financial sector 
(4.942) was greater than that of Paris (4.502), and 
was in fact greater than the combined CCI value 
of Germany (4.108). However, the reality is more 
complicated than what the numbers show, because 
Beijing is neither considered as a globally impor-
tant financial centre, nor even as the leading finan-
cial centre within China (Lai, 2012; Chen, Chen, 
2015). The future role of the Chinese capital in the 
global financial sector is unpredictable. On the one 
hand, in contrast to the international financial cen-
tres, Beijing does not have a stock exchange; there-
fore, Beijing-headquartered companies are listed in 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, but more frequently in the stock 
exchanges of New York, London, and Frankfurt 
(Gillis, 2014). Chen and Chen (2014: 18) claim 
that Beijing’s bid to become an international finan-
cial centre is hampered by its lack of a stock mar-
ket. According to Taylor et al. (2014: 868), Beijing 
is better connected to political world cities such as 
Washington and Brussels, and to other Pacific Asian 
cities, than to Shanghai, while the latter is better 
connected to the international financial centres such 
as New York, London, and Frankfurt. Although all 
giant state-owned banks (e.g. Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China) are headquartered in Beijing, the 
bulk of the domestic and offshore financial activities 
are carried out in the triad of Hong Kong, Shang-
hai, and Shenzhen (Zhao, 2003; Zhao et al., 2004; 
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KPMG, 2011; Lai, 2012). On the other hand, Bei-
jing-based banks control large amount of assets: in 
2015, the combined assets of nine of Beijing’s ma-
jor and regional banks ranked by Forbes exceeded 
$13,343 billion, more than that of any other finan-
cial centres in the world, even three times more 
than Japan’s GDP (7). As a result, Beijing-based 
banks are becoming more aggressive about expand-
ing outside of China (Forbes, 2012), which eventu-
ally could contribute to the positioning of Beijing as 
a major international financial centre.
Fig. 3. Contribution of the financial sector to the CCI value of the major command and control centres
Source of data: Forbes “The Global 2,000”, 2006 and Forbes “The Global 2,000”, 2015
It is worth noting that this exposure to the finan-
cial sector can now be regarded as the main source 
of Beijing’s increasing power, adding the Chinese 
capital to the ranks as a global leader command and 
control centre, but this exposure can pose a threat 
as well. In accordance with Sassen’s (2001) defini-
tion of global cities as key locations for finance, 
New York, Tokyo, London, and Paris were ranked 
top in the CCI ranking for 2015, and their positions 
were largely influenced by the performance of their 
financial sectors. However, the contribution of the 
financial sector to the total CCI value of Beijing is 
even larger than that of the global cities (Fig. 3). 
While the contribution of the financial sector to the 
CCI value of Tokyo, Paris, and London remains un-
der 50% respectively, and New York slightly exceeds 
50%, the ratio of the financial sector in the total 
CCI value of Beijing is 65%, which means that Bei-
jing’s command and control function significantly 
depends on the performance of its financial sector.  
A third dimension of Beijing’s command and 
control function has recently emerged. In 2015, 
a China-led international financial institution, 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), was 
launched with the goal of providing financing for 
infrastructure projects of developing countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region. It is now expected that Chi-
nese construction services companies will be the 
main actors of large infrastructure development 
projects abroad. Since 80% of the major construc-
tion services companies are headquartered in the 
Chinese capital, it can be predicted that the pow-
er of Beijing’s command and control function will 
gradually increase.
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6. Conclusion
Over the past half-century, but primarily since the 
publication of Friedmann’s world city hypothesis pa-
per in 1986, it has become common to rank cities 
on the basis of the concentration and/or the eco-
nomic performance of the TNCs they host. How-
ever, in the 1980s, both the United States and the 
United Kingdom introduced neoliberal economic 
policies that have resulted in the growing signifi-
cance of finance and services and the diminishing 
significance of the traditional manufacturing sec-
tor in these leading economies. Since the begin-
ning of the 1990s, especially as a result of Sassen’s 
book The Global City, researchers have begun to 
study economic globalization from a different per-
spective; according to which, the significance of the 
concentration of manufacturing firms as features of 
world cities has constantly depreciated (see, for ex-
ample, Sassen, 1991; Castells, 1996; Taylor, 2004). 
This development has led to some varying perspec-
tives. For example, in the ranking of the Globaliza-
tion and World Cities Research Network, in terms 
of their advanced producer services, Dubai, which 
is not a  particularly important command and con-
trol centre, occupies a more distinguished position 
(Alfa+) than Seoul (Alfa–), one of the largest eco-
nomic hubs in the world (8). However, on the basis 
of Friedmann’s world city approach, these two cit-
ies are considered in a different way. Seoul, as home 
to 59 powerful TNCs with combined revenues of 
$1,337 billion, is one of the major command and 
control centres in the world (ranked 8th in the CCI 
ranking for 2015), whereas, only six companies of 
regional importance with combined revenues of $15 
billion are headquartered in Dubai (ranked 125th in 
the CCI ranking for 2015). Therefore, with respect to 
the power of large companies, regardless of their sec-
tors, an alternative urban hierarchy can be created.
In this paper, I have examined the position of 
cities as command and control centres on the basis 
of the power of their headquartered corporations. 
The result shows that until 2012, New York, Lon-
don, Tokyo, and Paris; i.e. the global cities, were 
the leading command and control centres. Howev-
er, due to the massive growth of the Chinese econ-
omy, the gap between the global cities and Beijing 
gradually closed, and by 2015, the Chinese capi-
tal outranked all the global cities. The outstanding 
performance of corporations operating in financial, 
energy, and construction services sectors is the driv-
ing force behind Beijing’s increasing global power. 
In addition, the leading position of the global cities 
as command and control centres has been threat-
ened by the San Francisco-San Jose metropolitan re-
gion, a newly emerging economic hub in the United 
States.
Notes
(1) http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/
content/en/the_group/production_plants.html
(2) There is disagreement as to whether the 
high-level decision-making process in TNCs is 
centralised in global headquarters, or wheth-
er a more diffuse structure exists (see, for ex-
ample, Jones, 2002). As for Volkswagen’s diesel 
scandal, it has become clear that most strategic 
decisions (even the technical design of the soft-
ware) were made in Wolfsburg with the knowl-
edge of the CEO (Smith, Parloff, 2016).
(3) The reason for choosing the period from 2006 
to 2015 are that following: on the one hand, 
this period covers the financial crisis of 2007–
2008 and the following global economic cri-
sis of 2008–2012, and on the other hand, when 
preparing the analysis, the Forbes “The Global 
2,000” for 2015 was the most up-to-date data-
set available.
(4) In the case of the United States “cities” corre-
spond to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (as de-
fined by the Office of Management and Budget), 
but not to Combined Statistical Areas. In the 
case of the European Union “cities” correspond 
to Functional Urban Areas (as defined by the ES-
PON), but not to polynuclear metropolitan areas.
(5) In this paper, I examined the command and 
control function of cities in a closed system, 
and in this system cities’ CCI values are rel-
ative values. This means that the total value 
of the CCI never grows over time, and always 
remains the same. It necessarily follows from 
the way the CCI values are calculated in this 
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system that the CCI values of some cities will 
decrease, whereas those of some cities will in-
crease. These cities, of course, are not winners 
and losers, the change of cities’ CCI value ex-
presses the change of their relative positions. As 
a matter of fact, the world economy is expand-
ing, and cities’ command and control function 
also grows (slower in the case of some cities, 
and faster in other cases).
(6) The definition of developing countries is based on 
the classification of the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook, April 2015.
(7) The World Bank, 2016: GDP at market prices 
(current US$)
(8) The World According to GaWC 2012 is available 
at http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2012t.html
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